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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Because of the great amount of business done with credit cards,
it is vital that there be some definitive solution to the problem of
which of the two parties, the issuer or the holder, should be held
responsible for unauthorized purchases made with credit cards. It
appears that the result reached in Diners' Club is the fairest. If
neither the issuer, holder, nor merchant has been negligent, and if
the parties have used due care in carrying out their various duties,
or if only the holder has been negligent, the contractual liability
clause between the issuer and the holder should be given full force
and the holder should be liable for the unauthorized purchases.
However, as between the holder and the issuer, the issuer is
better in a position to prevent unauthorized charges. Therefore,
if the issuer or merchant has been negligent in accepting charges,
the issuer and not the holder should be the one to suffer. To
hold otherwise would be to encourage lax practices among the
merchants, for the merchants' examination of credit cards would
become even more perfunctory than at present if they knew they
would be repaid regardless of whether the charges were authorized.
Requiring due care by all parties in the three-party credit card sit-
uat-ion is the most equitable solution to the problem.
HOWARD S. IRVIN
Criminal Law-Statutory Rape-Mistake of Age-Me'ns Rea
Prior to People v. Hernandez,' all American jurisdictions faced
with an ignorance or mistake of age plea in statutory rape cases
have held it not to be a valid defense.' Upon facts showing that the
defendant and the prosecutrix were not married, that the prosecutrix
was under the statutory age of eighteen,3 and that the prosecutrix
139 Cal. Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964).
' Ignorance of age is no defense even though based on a good faith
belief that the female was above the prohibited age. Commonwealth v.
Murphy, 165 Mass. 66, 42 N.E. 504 (1895); State v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654,
19 S.W. 35 (1892). This is true even where there has been an exercise
of reasonable care to ascertain her age. Manning v. State, 43 Tex. Crim.
302, 65 S.W. 920 (1901). It is also true where the defendant was misled
by her appearance or her misrepresentations. Brown v. State, 23 Del. 159,
74 Atl. 836 (7 Penn. 1909); Heath v. State, 173 Ind. 296, 90 N.E. 310
(1910); Harris v. State, 115 Tex. Crim. 227, 28 S.W.2d 813 (1930).
See generally 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 241 (12th
ed. 1952).
' CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.
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voluntarily engaged in an act of sexual intercourse with the de-
fendant, the California Supreme Court in Hernandez departed
from the settled law and overruled its prior decisions4 on this issue.
The court applied two other sections of the California Penal Code,
both codifications of common law principles, and reversed the con-
viction of statutory rape, on the grounds that the trial court had
committed error in excluding evidence of the defendant's belief of
the prosecutrix's age. Although the sufficiency of the defendant's
belief was not at issue and thus not determined, the court held the
defendant's offer of this evidence "demonstrated a sufficient basis
upon which, when fully developed, the trier of fact might have
found in defendant's favor."5
The rationale of the court in deciding Hernandez followed three
logical steps. It first recognized the common law principle that there
can be no criminal offense without the element of mens rea,6 which
the California legislature had codified in section 20 of its Penal
Code by declaring that there must be a joint operation of act and
intent to constitute a crime.7 Secondly, the court decided that
statutory rape is not an offense made punishable without proof of
culpability. It viewed the legislative intent expressed in section 20
as controlling judicial interpretation of statutes that are not ex-
'People v. Griffin, 117 Cal. 583, 49 Pac. 711 (1897), and People v.
Ratz, 115 Cal. 132, 46 Pac. 915 (1896), were overruled. People v. Sheffield,
9 Cal. App. 130, 98 Pac. 67 (1908) was disapproved. When Ratz was
decided, the statutory age was fourteen and it was contended
that, even though the child be shown to have been under the age of
fourteen years, yet that, if the defendant had reason to believe, and did
believe, that she was over the age of fourteen years, then there was an
absence of the necessary intent to constitute a crime, and that he should
be acquitted. He asked the court to give instruction to the jury embodying
this as a proposition of law.
People v. Ratz, supra at 134, 46 Pac. at 916. It was held no error to refuse
the proposed instruction.
39 Cal. Rptr. at 366, 393 P.2d at 678.
'At common law a guilty mind or intent was essential. United States
v. Schultze, 28 F. Supp. 234 (D.C. Ky. 1939); State v. Weisberg, 74 Ohio
App. 91, 55 N.E.2d 870 (1943); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 345 Pa. 456,
28 A.2d 894 (1942). For the purposes of this note, mens rea does not refer to
the awareness of wrong-doing related to a mistake of law but to the aware-
ness of the facts that give character to the act. "Ordinarily one is not guilty
of a crime unless he is aware of the existence of all those facts which make
his conduct criminal. That awareness is all that is meant by the mens rea,
the 'criminal intent', necessary to guilt ... " United States v. Crimmins,
123 F.2d 271, 272 (2d Cir. 1941).
' "In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint
operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence." CAL. PENAL CODE § 20.
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plicit as to the element of intent. The court concluded that a strict
liability standard should not be imposed in the absence of a declara-
tion in the governing statute that this is the result deemed necessary.
In the final step, the court applied section 26 of the Penal Code,
which provides that a mistake of fact disproves criminal intent.'
Since awareness of age is one of the facts that give character to the
act, it concluded that, given the proper circumstances and proof, such
lack of knowledgeable conduct could be a proper defense in statutory
rape.9
Although Hernandez departs from the previously unanimous,
strict rule by allowing a mistake-of-age defense, its real importance
is that it is the first adequate treatment by a court of the necessity
of the mental element in statutory rape. For it is only by first hold-
ing that criminal intent is necessary that mistake of fact can become
an effective defense. Obviously, if knowledgeable conduct is not a
prerequisite, the lack of knowledgeable conduct will be immaterial.
As stated above, mens rea was a fundamental requirement of
common law offenses, but when the various legislatures codified com-
mon law crimes or created offenses by statute, the relevancy of the
mental element was often left for the courts to determine. Some
statutes, either by expressly requiring a specific intent'0 or by provid-
ing that the conduct be "knowingly" or "willfully" done," leave
little room for judicial construction. However, where the governing
statute is silent as to the requisite mental element, judicial interpre-
tation faces a problem. Criminal intent is either read into the
statute or, in effect, eliminated. The former generally applies to
common law crimes that have been codified 2 or crimes involving
I "All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging
to the following classes: .... Persons who committed the act or made the
omission charged under an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves
any criminal intent." CAL. PENAL CODE § 26.
' The California court had previously applied the same two sections to
bigamy and allowed a good faith belief that a former wife had obtained a
divorce as a valid defense. People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850
(1956).
10E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-54 (Supp. 1963) (break and enter with
intent to commit a felony); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-90 (1953) (fraudulent
intent in embezzlement).
11 For judicial interpretation, see, e.g., Dearing v. United States, 167 F.2d
310 (10th Cir. 1948). For a state court's interpretation, see State v.
Whitener, 93 N.C. 590 (1885). But see United States v. Gunn, 97 F. Supp.
476 (D.C. Ark. 1950), stating that these are words of many meanings." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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moral turpitude.'3 In this instance, the statute is viewed in the light
of the common law and it is assumed that if this element were to be
eliminated, the legislative intent would have been expressed. 4 The
latter interpretation is given to statutes or administrative regula-
tions called "public welfare offenses." 5 These statutes are designed
to increase the duties of those in control of particular industries,
trades, properties, or activities that affect public health, safety, or
welfare, and their breaches are not true crimes even though criminal
penalties are imposed.' 6 They are directed more at neglect or in-
action than the aggression or invasion dealt with by the common law.
A violation is regarded as an offense against the authority of the
state, because its "occurrence impairs the efficiency of controls
deemed essential to the social order as presently constituted. In
this respect, whatever the intent of the violator, the injury is the
same . . . . "I Since the accused is the one best able to prevent the
violation by reasonable care, he acts at his peril to ascertain the true
nature of his act.' 8 Moreover, the penalties are generally light with
little if any threat to reputation. The vast number of such offenses' 9
3 "The general rule is that in all statutory crimes involving moral turpi-
tude criminal intent is an implied, necessary ingredient." Seaboard Oil Co. v.
Cunningham, 51 F.2d 321, 324 (5th Cir. 1931). For a distinction between
inala in se and inala prohibita, see State v. Erlandson, 126 Mont. 316, 249
P.2d 794 (1952).
' Masters v. United States, 42 App. D.C. 350 (Ct. App. 1914).
15 Examples of public welfare offenses are illegal sales of liquor, sales
of impure food or drugs, sales of misbranded articles, violations of anti-
narcotic acts, criminal nuisances, traffic regulations, and motor vehicle laws.
See generally Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55 (1933).
18 "Prosecutions for petty penalties have always constituted in our
law a class by themselves.... That is true though the prosecution is criminal
in form." Tenement House Dep't v. McDevitt, 215 N.Y. 160, 168-69, 109
N.E. 88, 90 (1915).
' Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952).
18 "In these cases there is a voluntary act which the party does at his
peril, and he is not to be excused either by ignorance of the law or ignorance
of the fact. Either kind of ignorance implies a fault, and it must be assumed
that with due diligence the true character of the act could have been as-
certained." FREUND, POLICE POWER 635-36 (1904).
1" It is needless to point out that, swamped with such appalling inunda-
tions of cases of petty violations, the lower criminal courts would be
physically unable to examine the subjective intent of each defendant, even
were such determination desirable. As a matter of fact it is not; for the
penalty in such cases is so slight that the courts can afford to disregard
the individual in protecting the social interest.
The ready enforcement which is vital for effective petty regulation on
an extended scale can be gained only by a total disregard of the state of
mind.
Sayre, supra note 15, at 69-70.
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and the purpose of protecting the public2° make speedy enforcement
a matter of necessity. These considerations have led the courts to
construe the silence of the legislature as dispensing with intent and
as making the guilty act alone the crime.
However, statutory rape presents a striking exception to the
general rule of statutory construction. Statutes creating this offense,
which was a common law crime2' and which courts consider to in-
volve moral turpitude,22 are not viewed in the light of the common
law. Instead, whoever commits the offense is said to act at his peril,
at least as far as the girl's age is concerned; in other words, knowl-
edge of her age is not an element of the offense.2"
This felony falls within the category of crimes "in which, on
grounds of public policy, certain acts are made punishable with-
out proof that the defendant understands the facts that give char-
acter to his act," . . and proof of an intent is not indispensable
to conviction. . . . "The law makes the act the crime, and infers
a criminal intent from the act itself."
'24
Although this inference, in effect, eliminates intent, the courts
continue to speak in terms of mens rea, the idea being that it
varies according to the nature of the offense. While murder re-
quires a mind equal to malice aforethought and theft an intention
2 An exception to the common law requirement of criminal intent is
recognized in statutes the nature of which are police regulations and the
purpose of which would be obstructed by such a requirement. United States
v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922). The owner of the car in People v. Harrison,
183 App. Div. 812, 37 N.Y. Crim. 20, 170 N.Y. Supp. 876 (1918), was
held for his chauffer's speeding. It was no defense that he was talking to
his wife and did not know how fast the car was going, because to allow
such a defense would allow all owners to escape the obligations of the law.
2 "Sir Matthew Hale is, indeed, of the opinion that such profligate actions
committed on an infant under the age of twelve years, the age of female dis-
cretion by common law, either with or without consent, amount to rape and
felony, as well since as before the statute of Queen Elizabeth; but that law
has in general been held only to extend to infants under ten.... ." 4 BLACK-
STONE, COmMENTA~iES *212.
"An alien guilty of statutory rape is guilty of a crime involving "moral
turpitude" so as to authorize deportation. Bendel v. Nagle, 17 F.2d 719
(9th Cir. 1927). Moral turpitude "'is a vague term, its meaning depending
to some extent upon the state of public morals. It is defined as anything
that is done contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals ....
Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact
whether it is punishable by law.'" United States ex rel. Berlandi v. Reimer,
30 F. Supp. 767, 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
"3 Brown v. State, 23 Del. 159, 74 At. 836 (7 Penn. 1909).
"Simons v. State, 151 Fla. 778, 782-83, 10 So. 2d 436, 438 (1942).
Accord, State v. Wade, 224 N.C. 760, 32 S.E.2d 314 (1944).
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permanently to deprive the owner of his property, statutory rape
requires only that the defendant intend to do the act. It is reasoned
that intention is an element of voluntary action; all crimes except
omissions must be voluntary actions; therefore, intention is an ele-
ment of all criminal acts.25 Thus, when intercourse is voluntarily
engaged in, the male assumes a risk and the consequences that ensue.
It appears that this "at peril" doctrine arose because of an under-
lying notion that the conduct itself is "wrong," and statutory rape
has been distinguished from public welfare offenses on this basis.
26
The biblical view27 that extramarital intercourse is "wrong" con-
tinues in the express language of the statutes28 and in the "laws of
morality."2 Since the defendant has wrongfully done the very thing
contemplated by the legislature, he cannot set up a legal defense
by merely proving that he thought he was committing a different
kind of "wrong" from that which he in fact committed.30 The con-
cept of "wrong" also draws support from the outrage to parental
and community feelings because "an 'unwise' disposition of a girl's
sexual 'treasure,' it is thought, harms both her and the social struc-
ture which anticipates certain patterned uses. Hence, the law of
statutory rape must intervene to prevent what is predicted will be
an unwise disposition."'" Another factor influencing the courts in
this respect is the fear that such conduct may jeopardize the female
child's later sexual adjustment as well as cause some physical
damage.32 Premarital intercourse has also been condemned because
it is thought to lead to the spread of venereal disease and unwanted
" Brown v. State, 23 Del. 159, 74 Atl. 836 (7 Penn. 1909).
"o PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 699 (1957).
27 Fornication is forbidden. 1 Corinthians 10:8; 1 Thessalonians 4:3.
" "[T]he act is intrinsically wrong; for the statute says if 'unlawfully'
done. The act done with a mens rea is unlawfully and carnally knowing
the girl, and the man doing that act does it at the risk of the child being
under the statutory age." Regina v. Prince, L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154, 176
(1875). Accord, Heath v. State, 173 Ind. 296, 90 N.E. 310 (1910).
"9 "His intent to violate the laws of morality and the good order of
society, though with the consent of the girl, and though in a case when he
supposes he shall escape punishment, satisfies the demands of the law, and
he must take the consequences." State v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654, 661, 19 S.W.
35, 37 (1892).
" Regina v. Prince, L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154, 177 (1875) (concurring
opinion).
"' Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 76 (1953).
82 Ibid.
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pregnancies." Thus, the policy reasons of protecting society, family,
and infant demand the at-the-actor's-peril doctrine, and the courts
so construe the statutory rape laws.
North Carolina has two statutes pertaining to statutory rape.
Intercourse with a female under twelve is punishable by death or
life imprisonment." If the female is between twelve and sixteen
and a virgin, it is a felony punishable at the discretion of the court. 6
In both of these statutes intent is neither mentioned nor construed
to be an element. 6 Where the defense of mistake of age was raised,
it was held to be immaterial.
3 7
"' See sources listed in KINsEY, POMEROY & MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHrAVIOR
IN TE HUMAN MALE 560 (1948).
8 Every person who is convicted of ravishing and carnally knowing any
female of the age of twelve years or more by force and against her will,
or who is convicted of unlawfully and carnally knowing and abusing any
female child under the age of twelve years, shall suffer death: Provided,
if the jury shall so recommend at the time of rendering its verdict in
open court, the punishment shall be imprisonment for life in the State's
prison, and the court shall so instruct the jury.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (1953).
" "If any male person shall carnally know of abuse any female child,
over twelve and under sixteen years of age, who has never before had sexual
intercourse with any person, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be fined
or imprisoned in the discretion of the court." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-26
(1953).
" State v. Browder, 252 N.C. 35, 112 S.E.2d 728 (1960); State v. Jones,
249 N.C. 134, 105 S.E.2d 513 (1958); State v. Swindell, 189 N.C. 151,
126 S.E. 417 (1925) (by implication). Intent was not required even when
the statute provided for a mandatory death sentence. State v. Gibson,
221 N.C. 252, 20 S.E.2d 51 (1942).
" State v. Wade, 224 N.C. 760, 32 S.E.2d 314 (1944). The court stated:
One who has carnal knowledge of a female child under the age of twelve
years is guilty of rape, and the fact that the offender may have believed
the child was above the age of consent, will not mitigate the crime. The
statute does not require the State to charge or prove that a person in-
dicted thereunder must have known the female child to have been under
the age of consent; one having carnal knowledge of such a child, does
so at his peril, and his opinion as to her age, is immaterial.
Id. at 762, 32 S.E.2d at 315. The court also uses morality in varying de-
grees. In justifying a sentence of thirty years of hard labor for violation of
what is now N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-26 (1953), the court said that "the
defendant, a man of 26 years of age, ensnares a 13 year old girl, innocent
and virtuous, and debauches her under circumstances that would make him
guilty at least of such turpitude as amounts in morals to rape. For legal
rape the penalty is death." State v. Swindell, 189 N.C. 151, 154, 126 S.E.
417, 418 (1925).
The "abusing" constructed with the "carnally knowing" means the im-
posing upon, deflowering, degrading, illtreating, debauching and ruining
socially, as well as morally, perhaps, of the virgin of such tender years,
who, when yielding willingly, does so in ignorance of the consequences
and of her right and power to resist.
[Vol. 43
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It is the opinion of the writer that the statutory rape laws need
to be reconsidered. The history of this offense reveals that it was
designed to protect the female child below the age of discretion."8
Children under ten or twelve were conclusively presumed to have no
understanding of the nature and consequences of the sexual act.
Thus their consent was immaterial. Slowly, the statutory age limits
have been raised to sixteen, eighteen, or higher until its original
purpose is obscured. At some point in their growth, children begin
to understand sex. It has been said that substantially all females
have completed the period of sexual awakening by the end of their
fifteenth year.3 9 In light of this finding, the present judicial con-
struction of statutory rape can only be justified by the "wrongful"
conduct theory and by its deterrent effect. But to continue to up-
hold convictions "on the grounds that what was done would not
be proper even if the facts had been as the defendant reasonably
supposed them to be"40 is to ignore social realities. "Pursuit of
females who appear to be over 16 betokens no abnormality but only
a defiance of religious and social conventions which appear to be
fairly widely disregarded."'" The biblical view that the immoral
are to be judged by God 42 seems to comport with sound contemporary
thought about the purposes of a criminal code:
The Code does not attempt to use the power of the state to
enforce purely moral or religious standards. We deem it inap-
propriate for the government to attempt to control behavior
that has no substantial significance except as to the morality
of the actor. Such matters are best left to religious, educa-
tional and other social influences. Apart from the question
of constitutionality which might be raised against legislation
State v. Monds, 130 N.C. 697, 700, 41 S.E. 789, 790 (1902). Justice Clark,
dissenting in State v. Hart, 186 N.C. 582, 605, 120 S.E. 345, 356 (1923),
advocated the conviction of an aider and abettor in a statutory rape case,
quoting an English Chancellor: "Morality comes in the cold abstract from
the pulpit, but men smart practically under its lessons when we lawyers
are the teachers." Id. at 608, 120 S.E. at 358.
" State v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654, 19 S.W. 35 (1892); State v. Bowman,
232 N.C. 374, 61 S.E.2d 107 (1950); State v. Johnston, 76 N.C. 209 (1877).
See also State v. Hart, 186 N.C. 582, 590, 120 S.E. 345, 349 (1923) (Clark-
son, J., dissenting). For Blackston's support of this statement, see note 21
supra. See generally PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THES LAw 178 (1951).
" MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4, comment at 252 & n.134 (Tent. Draft No.
4, 1955).
' PmRins, op. cit. supra note 26, at 699.
' MODEL PENAL CODn § 207.4, comment at 253 (Tent. Draft No. 4 1955).
"'Hebrews 13:4. Cf. John 8:4-11.
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avowedly commanding adherence to a particular religious or
moral tenet, it must be recognized, as a practical matter, that in
a heterogeneous community such as ours, different individuals
and groups have widely divergent views of the seriousness of
various moral derelictions.
43
Moreover, the act of intercourse alone is not a "wrong" in the legal
sense of that word, for when discreetly done with a girl above the
statutory age and with her consent, it would go unpunished under
most fornication and adultery laws.4 4 Realizing that the act must
be punished as it was intended to be at its commission and not as it
was later found to be,45 the common law doctrine of mistake of fact
is pertinent. It should not be assumed that what the defendant did
was unlawful within the meaning of the statute, for that is the very
question to be determined. The courts, accordingly, must face
directly the issue of intent. To uphold the "at peril" interpretation
without the "wrongful" conduct theory would be an extention of the
rationale applied to a public welfare offense. This extention should
,' MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.1, comment at 207 (Tent. Draft No. 4 1955).
For a related discussion, see Schwartz, Morals Offenses AWd The Model
Petal Code, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 669 (1963).
"At the present time 11 of the 48 states have no fornication statute,
and only 18 punish a single act of intercourse between unmarried persons
(four of these by fine alone). The rest of the states require either a con-
tinuous or an "open and notorious" relationship, or both. Fornication
is not criminal in England or, generally speaking, in the rest of the world.
Model Penal Code § 207.1, comment at 204-05 (Tent. Draft No. 4 1955).
"Lewdly and lasciviously... cohabit" in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (1953)
implies habitual intercourse, and the single act will not constitute fornication
and adultery. State v. Kleiman, 241 N.C. 277, 85 S.E.2d 148 (1954); State
v. Ivey, 230 N.C. 172, 52 S.E.2d 346 (1949); State v. Davenport, 225 N.C.
13, 33 S.E.2d 136 (1945). Quaere: Is "open" conduct necessary? It seems
to play a part, although not required, in State v. Davenport, supra. When is
requisite habitual intercourse, "in the manner of husband and wife," estab-
lished? In State v. McDuffie, 107 N.C. 885, 12 S.E. 83 (1890), an instruc-
tion that habitual illicit sexual intercourse for two weeks was sufficient
to constitute the offense was approved, but the facts reveal that the defendants
lived together in a one-room house during the period and that they were
seen together in a bunk at least four different times.
" To constitute a crime the personal volition or negligence of the actor
preceding the act is essential. Whether or not the exculpatory defense
that in so exercising his volition there was no criminal intent will
avail him depends upon whether the defense was at common law, where
the criminal intent is essential, or under a statute where it is not.
State v. American Agricultural Chem Co., 118 S.C. 333, 338, 110 S.E. 800, 802
(1922). The intent and the act, at least, must concur. People v. Walrath,
279 App. Div. 56, 108 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1951).




be rejected because statutory rape carries the stigma of a true crime,
severe penalties, prolonged loss of liberty, and substantial loss to
reputation. Faced with these consequences, a defendant must be
given an opportunity to litigate his guilt even though the purpose of
the law, a factor in the public welfare offense rationale, is slightly
hindered.
The theory of deterrence does not seem to support a strict lia-
bility standard where the age has been raised to such limits as are
now found in statutes. Dr. Kinsey's report shows a gap between
what men do and what the law assumes they do. His finding that
eighty-five per cent of the total male population has premarital in-
tercourse47 becomes important when considered with these findings:
late adolescence in males is the period of greatest sexual activity;4
most males have intercourse with girls of about their own age;49
and the number of persons participating and the frequency of the
act vary according to the educational and social level.5" Among
groups with no more than grade school education that were sur-
veyed in two or three lower level communities, the reporters were
"unable to find a solitary male who had not had sexual relations with
girls by the time he was 16 or 17 years of age."'" Thus, while there
may be public abhorrence attached to the commission of sexual
intercourse among unmarried persons, there is evidence of an
equally widespread practice which is privately regarded as normal
and expected.
52
Not only has the effectiveness of such statutes been placed in
doubt, but also the severe consequences of the present construction
"" KINSEY, POMEROY & MARTIN, op. cit. supra note 33, at 392.
,8 Id. at 219.
"Id. at 558.
"98% of the males with grade school education or less, 84% of those
with high school education, and 67% of those with college education have
premarital intercourse. Id. at 549-52.
"Id. at 381.
One complicating factor in this respect relates to the difference in
perspectives identified with culture and class between those who legislate
and those who enforce the law.
Anglo-American sex laws are a codification of the sexual mores of the
better educated portion of the population. . . . However, the enforce-
ment of the law is placed in the hands of police officials who come largely
from grade school and high school segments of the population. For that
reason, the laws against non-marital intercourse are rarely and only
capriciously enforced, and then most often when upper level individuals
demand such police action.
Id. at 389-90.
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of them can be shown by statistics compiled in New York. During
the period of 1930-1939 in New York City, eighty-two per cent of
all rape convictions and fifty-nine per cent of all convicted "sex
offenders" were statutory rape situations involving acts of sexual
intercourse with the consent of girls under eighteen.5 8 Thus, with
premarital intercourse on the increase 4 and with the lack of official
diligence or public clamor that is characteristic of forcible rape
cases, 5 5 a basic injustice against the male prevails under the present
statutes and their judicial construction. Considering the severe
penalty and the irreparable damage to character, one fails to see
justification to include the innocent in order to convict the guilty.
What is being advocated is not an elimination of statutory rape
laws but only a return to their original purpose and objectives. The
conflicting views of the protection of infants and chastity and of the
protection of an individual's rights could be reconciled with a
recognition of the mental element that is involved in statutory rape.
Such recognition would permit only the punishment for conscious vio-
lations of the law and would protect the child obviously or known to
be below the age of consent. But, because physical development and
sexual sophistication appear well before the present age limits,"0 bona
fide mistakes will occur and should be considered in the determina-
tion of guilt. Criminal intent could be made an element of statutory
rape by either of two methods. Courts could give judicial notice
to the statute's purpose and the present attitude of society and apply
their mens rea statute 7 to overrule past precedents, as California
did. In jurisdictions without such a statute, the common law prin-
ciple would be sufficient grounds for a different construction. The
abnormality of seeking out the very young5 8 and the practical diffi-
culties of reasonableness would take care of a groundless defense
of mistake of age. A better approach seems to be a clear declaration
" PLoSCOWE, op. cit. supra note 38, at 178; Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 74
n.13 1 (1955).
"DRUMMOND, THE SEX PARADOX 321 (1953).
Comment, 62 YALE LJ. 55, 75 (1955).
=' MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4, comment (Tent. Draft. No. 4, 1955).
E.g., Aniz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 13-131 (1956); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-1-1 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-201 (1953); IDAHO CODE § 18-114
(1948); MONT. REV. CODE § 94-117 (1949); Nrv. REV. STAT. § 193-190
(1957); UTAH CODE § 76-1-20 (1953).
"s"[A]n adult male's proclivity for sex relations with children is a
recognized symptom of mental aberration, called pedophilia." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 207.4, comment at 251-52 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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by the legislature of its purpose and intent within the governing
statute, much in the fashion of the Model Penal Code. There a
two step grading system was employed, providing that all inter-
course under ten to be rape59 and consensual intercourse with a
female less than sixteen is to be corruption of a minor. ° The
original purpose of the law is given effect by declaring that mistake
of age will not be a proper defense to the former but will be to the
latter. " '
The way is open in North Carolina for either approach. The
one case 2 denying a mistake of age defense upon the rationale of
other jurisdictions could be distinguished on its facts-the prose-
cutrix was nine, the defendant was twenty-three, and the record re-
veals serious doubts as to the reasonableness of his belief. Given
the proper case, the court could then properly deal with the criminal
intent involved by following the three logical steps of recognizing
the common law requirement of mens rea, of rejecting the "wrong-
"MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
"° MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
"With respect to sex offenses, MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962) states:
(1) Mistake as to Age. Whenever in this Article the criminality of
conduct depends on a child's being below the age of 10, it is no defense
that the actor did not know the child's age, or reasonably believed the
child to be older than 10. When criminality depends on the child's being
below a critical age other than 10, it is a defense for the actor to prove
that he reasonably believed the child to be above the critical age.
As another example of a legislative declaration, reference is made to the
present law in England: The Sexual Offenses Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 69,
which provides in part as follows:
6. Intercourse with girl between 13 and 16.-(1) It is an offence, subject
to the exceptions mentioned in this section, for a man to have unlawful
sexual intercourse with a girl not under the age of thirteen but under
the age of sixteen.
(3) A man is not guilty of an offence under this section because he
has unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of sixteen, if he
is under the age of twenty-four and has not previously been charged with
a like offence, and he believes her to be of the age of sixteen or over and
has reasonable cause for the belief.
In the past, North Carolina has relied on the English law in shaping its
sex laws. The following are some examples of this reliance: the definition
of carnal knowledge, State v. Johnston, 76 N.C. 209 (1877); necessity of
proof of emission of seed as well as penetration for conviction, State v. Gray,
53 N.C. 170 (1860) [later changed by the legislature to a requirement of
only penetration, State v. Hodges, 61 N.C. 231 (1867)]; sufficient indict-
ment even without the words "female child," State v. Goings, 20 N.C. 289
(1838).
" State v. Wade, 224 N.C. 760, 32 S.E.2d 314 (1944).
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ful" conduct theory and the analogy to public welfare offenses, and
of allowing the common law mistake of fact defense. In this
manner, past precedents on the issue of intent could be overruled.
The legislative approach is applicable because under the present
classification, the age limit of twelve reasonably corresponds to
the purpose of the law and a declaration by the legislature that mis-
take of age will not be given credence would be appropriate. During
the prohibited period of twelve to sixteen, the legislature has al-
ready recognized the consequences of the "at peril" doctrine and
tempered it by requiring that it must be the female's first inter-
course. This requirement will not always be sufficient to protect the
male from injustice. To alleviate any possible injustice, the legis-
lature could declare that intent is a necessary element or that mis-
take of age is to be a defense of this offense.
Punishment at the discretion of the court does not minimize the
fact that the defendant is branded a felon, which in many cases is
an unnecessary attribution of guilt to individual defendants and an
irrational response by a society which cannot realistically expect to
derive any general deterrence thereby.
DAVID A. IRVIN
Insurance-Insurer's Liability for Injuries Intentionally Inflicted by
Insured by Use of Automobile
In Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts,' the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that a person injured by one insured under a
"compulsory" or "asigned risk" automobile liability insurance policy
issued under the North Carolina Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial
Responsibility Act of 19532 could recover from the insurer, not-
withstanding the fact that the insured had intentionally inflicted
the injury by assault and battery. The insurer disclaimed liability
on three bases: that the coverage extended only to those persons
injured as the result of an "accident ' 3 and that injuries resulting
1261 N.C. 285, 134 S.E.2d 654 (1964).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1 to -279.39 (Supp. 1963).
3 The term "accident" has been defined as follows:
An event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation; an
undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event .... Hence .... an undesigned
and unforeseen occurrence of an afflictive or unfortunate character; a
mishap resulting in injury to a person or damage to a thing; a casualty....
* . . an unexpected happening not due to any negligence or malfeasance
of the party concerned.
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